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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-2-
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: 'The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ..., 
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction[.]"2 This is an appeal from the final judgment 
of the Third District Court in a civil matter, and although it has original appellate jurisdiction, 
the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) 
and § 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provide that the Supreme Court may transfer any matter over 
which it has original appellate jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Appellant, pursuant to the Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually 
Explicit Email Act, Utah Code §§ 13-36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002), can be found to have a 
preexisting relationship, which subjects him to commercial emails, when Appellant has 
affirmatively requested removal from that email list. 
2. Whether Appellant can be found to have a preexisting relationship with a 
business with whom Appellant has never done business because the SPAMMER purchased 
a mailing list from another person with whom the Appellant had done business? 
1
 Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5. 
2
 Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)0) (1953, as amended). 
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3. What is the meaning of "preexisting relationship" as used in the Utah Act? 
4. Whether the lower court erred by granting summary judgment without 
permitting any discovery to be conducted by the parties and while Appellant was seeking 
discovery under Ut.R.Civ.P. 56(f)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court should review the legal conclusions of the trial court (since this was a 
summary judgment it was resolved in toto upon legal conclusions) for correctness. 
"Generally, we review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, according the trial 
court no particular deference." Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, P 11, 
54 P.3d 1177, 1181 (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). 
This Court should review the statutory interpretations of the Third District Court for 
correctness. "We review the district court's statutory interpretations for correctness." Davis 
County Solid Waste Mgmt. v. City of Bountiful 2002 UT 60, P 9, 52 P.3d 1174. "We look 
first to the statute's plain language as evidence of the legislature's intent, and give effect to 
that plain language unless the statute is ambiguous." Id. at P 10. "We analyze the language 
of a statutory provision in light of other provisions within the same statute or act, and we 
attempt to harmonize the provisions in accordance with the legislative intent so as to give 
meaning to each provision." Id. 
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APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL 
Ut.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and Ut.R.Civ.P 56(f). These are set out in full in the accompanying 
Appendix to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This case involves the sending of an unsolicited commercial email by Sprint 
Communications, Inc. (Defendant/Appellee/Sprint) to Terry Gillman 
(Plaintiff/Appellant/Gillman) for which Gillman brought this action in accordance with the 
Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act found in Utah Code Annotated §§ 
13-36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002) (the "Statute"). This is a case of first impression. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
Gillman filed this action in the Third District Court, Sandy Division on June 18,2002 
alleging that Sprint sent or caused to be sent to Gillman an unsolicited commercial email in 
violation of the Statute. See Court Record (Ct. Rec.) p. 1-12. On September 17,2002, only 
19 days after the parties entered a Stipulated Discovery Schedule and Case Management 
Order (Ct. Rec. p. 85-91), Sprint filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, with supporting 
memoranda. (Ct. Rec. p. 103-59). On September 26, 2002, Gillman filed a motion and 
memorandum for Relief Under Rule 56(f) (Ct. Rec. p. 194-99) and an Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Ct. Rec. p. 210-47). 
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Pursuant to the direction of Judge Denise P. Lindberg, Sprint filed a revised 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, November 1,2002 
(Ct. Rec. pp. 288-338), and Plaintiff filed a revised Opposition November 8, 2002 (Ct. Rec. 
pp. 339-385). The matter came on for hearing before Judge Lindberg on December 10,2002. 
(Ct. Rec. p. 507). On February 28, 2003, Judge Lindberg filed her Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary Judgment, in which she granted 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The lower court found that there was a 
preexisting commercial relationship between Gillman and GroupLotto, and therefore the 
email sent by Sprint did not fit within the statutory definition of "unsolicited commercial 
email" (Ct. Rec. pp.505-13) and judgment was accordingly entered April 9, 2003 (Ct. Rec. 
pp. 522-24). 
Gillman filed his Notice of Appeal April 11,2003 (Ct. Rec. pp. 525-28) with the Utah 
Supreme Court which subsequently transferred this matter to this Court on July 18,2003 (Ct. 
Rec. p. 546). 
Facts established in the Record below: 
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1. April 14,2002, Gillman signed up for Audiogalaxy3, an on-line music service, 
which also allegedly registered him to receive offers and promotions from GroupLotto, 
another entity. Ct. Rec. p. 313, Affidavit of Kate Vein, Exhibit A of Defendant's Revised 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, f 3. 
2. Sprint states in the Affidavit of Kate Vein, used as support for it's 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment that Audiogalaxy is also affiliated with an 
entity named MAXWORLDWIDE. Ct. Rec. p. 313, Affidavit of Kate Vein, Exhibit A of 
Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, f 2. 
3. Sprint states in the Affidavit of Jared Brody, used as support for it's 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment that Traffix is a database marketing and 
management company4 that owns GroupLotto. Ct. Rec. p. 315, Affidavit of Jared Brody, 
Exhibit B of Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, <H 2,3. 
4. Sprint states in the Affidavit of Kate Vein, used as support for it's 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment that MAXWORLDWIDE has an agreement 
3Mr. Gillman visited Audiogalaxy to download music, not to obtain email 
solicitations. The "registration" was, according to Sprint, effective to give consent, and 
thereby a business relationship, for the affiliated GroupLotto and a host of others, 
including Sprint, to be able to SPAM Gillman. It is that attenuated claim of consent 
which the lower court accepted as a defense to Gillman's claims under Utah's Anti-Spam 
Act. 
4Meaning that it sells names for SPAM. This is a typical arrangement in the world 
of SPAMMERS, whose lifeblood is the email addresses of active accounts, such as Mr. 
Gillman's in this case. 
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with Traffix, whereby Traffix pays MAXWORLDWIDE to provide Traffix the email 
addresses of Audiogalaxy users. Ct. Rec. p. 313, Affidavit of Kate Vein, Exhibit A of 
Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, f 2. 
5. Sprint states in the Affidavit of Jared Brody, used as support for it's 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment that L90 is a separate, independent company 
that, among other things, transacts business with an online site known as Audiogalaxy. 
Under an agreement between Traffix and L90, people who sign up for Audiogalaxy can 
concurrently agree to receive via email information and offers from GroupLotto. Traffix 
pays L90 (who in turn pays Audiogalaxy) to provide the email address of those Audiogalaxy 
users who agree to receive such email. This is the process through which GroupLotto 
acquired the crash0922@aol.com address5. In other words, the user of email address 
crash0922@aol.com registered at the Audiogalaxy site and in the process of doing so, agreed 
through these attenuated agreements and sales of addresses to receive information and offers 
via email from GroupLotto. Ct. Rec. p. 316, Affidavit of Jared Brody, Exhibit B of 
Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, f 7. 
5This is Mr. Gillman's email address. 
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6. Gillman revoked the authorization6 of GroupLotto to send him spam email on 
May 14, 2002. Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff s 
Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, f4. 
7. May 15, 2002, GroupLotto un-subscribed Gillman from their email list. Ct. 
Rec. pp. 316-17, Affidavit of Jared Brody, Exhibit B of Defendant's Revised Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, f9. 
8. The Appellant has never given consent to Sprint to send email to him, nor does 
he have a prior history of doing business with Sprint. Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of 
Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, \1. 
9. Although the original consent and business was done with Audiogalaxy, the 
revocation on May 14, 2002 was sent to GroupLotto because they were the ones who had 
acquired from Audiogalaxy the claimed transfer of the original consent. Ct. Rec. p. 363, 
Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment, f 4; Ct. Rec. pp. 316-17, Affidavit of Jared Brody, 
Exhibit B of Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, f9. 
6Although there was never any relationship between Gillman and GroupLotto (it 
was with Audiogalaxy), Gillman revoked any right GroupLotto had to send him 
unsolicited email. The Court should note that such relationship as GroupLotto had was 
entirely derivative from Audiogalaxy and was not direct with Mr. Gillman. 
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10. GroupLotto is a subsidiary of Traffix, Inc. a Delaware Corporation. Ct. Rec. 
p. 316, Affidavit of Jared Brody, Exhibit B of Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment, f 3. Gillman has not done business with Traffix, Inc. 
either. Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's 
Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, f 7. 
11. . Traffix, Inc. contracted with Sprint to market certain Sprint products via email, 
making Traffix, Inc. an advertiser for Sprint. Ct. Rec. p. 315, Affidavit of Jared Brody, 
Exhibit B of Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, f 6. 
12. Several days after Plaintiff requested to be removed from the GroupLotto 
emailing list, due to the large amount of unsolicited emails received from them, he received 
another commercial advertisement for Sprint, soliciting Appellant to sign up for a Sprint 
long distance program from GroupLotto, the subsidiary of Traffix, Inc. as Sprint's 
advertising agent. Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of 
Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, <j[ 5; Ct. Rec. p. 
508, Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, fl. 
13. Gillman has no preexisting business or personal relationship with Sprint, who 
is the one who caused the illegal email to be sent. Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry 
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Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiffs Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, f7 . 
14. The emails sent by Sprint were for the purpose of promoting the sale, lease, or 
exchange of goods, services or real property over the Internet, and are therefore classified by 
the statute mentioned above, as "commercial emails." Ct. Rec. p. 508, Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary Judgment, f5\ Ct. Rec. pp. 
370-72, Email attached to Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's 
Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
15. The emails sent by the Defendant were sent through a computer network, 
which by statutory definition is two (2) or more computers which are interconnected to 
exchange electronic messages, files, data, or other information. See Ut.Code Ann. § 13-36-
102(2). 
16. The email sent by Sprint through their advertiser to Gillman was unsolicited, 
sent without his permission and was not sent as a result of a preexisting business or personal 
relationship with the recipient. Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit 
A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, f 7. 
17. The email sent did not contain the legal name of Sprint. Ct. Rec. pp. 370-72, 
email attached to Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
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18. The email sent did not contain the correct street address of Sprint. Ct. Rec. 
pp. 370-72, email attached to Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's 
Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
19. The email sent did not contain a valid Internet domain name for Sprint. Ct. 
Rec. pp. 370-72, email attached to Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of 
Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
20. The email sent did not contain a subject line which contained as the first four 
(4) characters the letters and symbol: "ADV." Ct. Rec. pp. 370-72, email attached to 
Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
21. The email sent did not contain a convenient, no-cost mechanism to notify 
sender not to send any future email, which mechanism includes sending a return email to a 
valid, functioning return electronic address. Ct. Rec. pp. 370-72, email attached to Second 
Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition 
to Summary Judgment. Further, it was sent despite Terry Gillman's earlier efforts to avoid 
getting such unwanted advertising by revoking his "consent." (See Fact No. 6, above.) 
22. The email sent did not contain conspicuously provided text in the email as 
notice informing the Appellant that he may conveniently and at no cost be excluded from 
future commercial email from Sprint. Ct. Rec. pp. 370-72, email attached to Second 
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Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition 
to Summary Judgment. 
23. On February 28, 2003, the Third District Court granted Sprint's Motion for 
Summary Judgment based upon the erroneous conclusion that as a matter of law Gillman had 
a preexisting relationship with GroupLotto, the actual sender of the email, and without regard 
to Sprint's liability under the Statute as one "causing the email to be sent." Ct. Rec. pp. 
510-13, Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, H 16-26. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellant, pursuant to the Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit 
Email Act, Utah Code §§ 13-36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002), cannot be found to have a 
preexisting relationship, which subjects him to commercial emails, when Appellant has 
affirmatively requested removal from that email list. The lower court erred when it found 
a preexisting relationship to have existed. That relationship ended once the termination had 
occurred, and the email was sent two days later. 
2. Appellant cannot in any event be found to have a preexisting relationship with 
a business with whom Appellant has never done business merely because the SPAMMER 
purchased a mailing list from another person with whom the Appellant had at one time done 
business. This proposition, which was accepted by the lower court, essentially defeats the 
Legislature's attempt to prevent SPAM. Any non-related party can purchase names from 
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others who had a business relationship and obtain a defense under the lower court's ruling. 
That would defeat the statute and cannot be a reasonable reading of the statute. 
3. The term "preexisting relationship" as used in the Utah Act must require a 
bona-fide commercial relationship as a result of which it would be reasonable to expect to 
receive communications. It should not include merely a purchase of a name from another 
party with such a bona-fide commercial relationship. The language implies a currently 
existing business relationship which predated the email, which relationship does not exist 
here. 
4. Granting summary judgment when there are questions of fact and a Plaintiff 
seeking discovery was wrong. The Appellant's Rule 56(f) motion should have been granted. 
There remained some issues which required factual testimony and the resolution of facts in 
favor of the non-moving party which prevented summary judgment or which required 
discovery. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. Once a Business Relationship Is Terminated It Should Not Be Deemed to 
Be Preexisting. 
Although Gillman has never conceded there existed any sort of a relationship with 
either GroupLotto, the physical sender of the email, or Sprint, who the lower court found to 
have caused the email to be sent, the lower court still found there to be a commercial 
relationship under the statute between Gillman and GroupLotto. Despite Sprint's allegations 
to the contrary, there was never any relationship between Gillman and GroupLotto. Gillman 
entered Audiogalaxy's website to download music. To be able to do that he had to become 
a member, that occurred on April 14,2003. On May 14,2003, he contacted GroupLotto and 
asked to have his email address taken from their email list because of the volume of SPAM 
he was getting from them. If there ever indeed was any sort of a relationship, it was 
unknown to Gillman and revoked soon after it allegedly began. Notwithstanding these facts, 
the lower court found there to be a relationship between the two, although it is difficult to 
imagine how. Because it found such a relationship to exist, that will be addressed. 
The lower court found that because Gillman once had a relationship7 with GroupLotto, 
the sender of the offending email, that even after he had terminated that relationship, he 
would forever be susceptible to unwanted SPAM emails from that sender, no matter who 
7That "relationship" was disputed. It arose, according to Sprint, as a result of 
Gillman going to Audiogalaxy's website. However, Gillman's only transaction with 
GroupLotto was telling it not to send him any more SPAM. 
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caused the email to be sent. Ct. Rec. pp. 510-13, Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary Judgment, f][ 16-26. In effect this carves out a "safe 
harbor" for SPAMMERS to use to send unsolicited email to such targets ad infinitum. It is 
a judicially created innovation to the Statute and not a provision of the Statute itself. This 
reading of the Statute appears to completely remove any teeth the Utah Statute has. Worse 
still, this interpretation puts the teeth into the SPAMMERS, who now are provided a 
permanent shield against liability for sending unwanted email advertising to Utah residents 
with whom they never had a bona fide preexisting relationship. 
The lower court's ruling fails to construe the meaning of the Statute according to its 
plain language. As stated by the lower court, "[a] fundamental rule of statutory construction 
is that statutes are to be construed according to their plain language." Arndt v. First 
Interstate Bank, 991 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah 1999) (quoting O-Keefe v. Utah State Retirement 
Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998)) and "where the statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, we do not look beyond the statute's plain meaning to divine legislative intent." 
Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P. 2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1991). Ct. Rec. pp. 511, 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
f 19. Despite giving lip service to these principles, the lower court did violence to the 
Statute's language and twisted its meaning beyond all recognition. 
The plain language of the Statute clearly indicates that a qualifying relationship 
(which we do not have here) can be terminated. Here the lower court has taken an 
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unqualified relationship and determined that it cannot be terminated. Ever. Once 
established, the lower court has found that such a relationship is eternal. That alone requires 
the lower court to be reversed. The Statute is being abused by the lower court's ruling. The 
lower court's opinion would have been no different had that hydra-headed SPAM conspiracy 
of Traffix-GroupLotto-Audiogalaxy-L90-MAXWORLDWIDE-Sprint8 wrote the opinion 
with the express purpose of reversing the Utah Statute. 
The Statute requires that the business relationship must exist at the time of the receipt 
of the offending email. The pertinent portion of that Statute for this issue is found in § 13-
36-102(8)(b), which states: "A commercial email is not 'unsolicited' if the sender has a 
preexisting business or personal relationship with the recipient." See Ut. Code Ann. § 13-36-
102(8)(b), provided as Exhibit in Appendix. This plainly requires the business relationship 
to be in existence at the time of the email, which was not the case here. 
Using the definition of "preexist" found in Webster's New World Dictionary (2d coll. 
ed. 1986), the lower court found that "a relationship between two parties can 'preexist' if 
it existed at any time in the past, even if that relationship has been subsequently 
terminated." Ct. Rec. p. 511, Mem. ^[21. (Emphasis added.) This however is not the 
8The cast of characters in this matter illustrates the pernicious nature of the SPAM 
industry. It spreads across divergent entities the email addresses of active accounts such 
as Mr. Gillman's. Once they know there is a functioning email address they rejoice and 
spread the good news. Which in turn results in a deluge of SPAM from all the 
conspirators. The lower court's opinion not only fails to prevent this, but actually 
encourages it. Under its opinion "consent" gets used with reckless abandon to immunize 
the entire industry. 
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wording of the Statute. It is an amendment and substantial alteration of the Statute. It 
extends the potential relationship defense much further than could possibly have been 
intended by the legislature. The Statute uses the word "preexisting" not "preexist." See Ut. 
Code Ann. § 13-36-102(8)(b), provided in the Appendix to this brief. The word 
"preexisting" connotes current existence or that the object continues to exist, not just that it 
existed at some remote time in the past. The addition of "ing" creates a present participle 
which gives the word a present tense application. This, in conjunction with the present tense 
verbiage used in the Statute, "has," can lead only to the conclusion that the relationship must 
exist at the time a recipient receives the email. Such a reading is not only plain, but also 
makes the Legislative intent actually accomplish something to prevent SPAM. The lower 
court's interpretation eviscerates the Statute and renders any prior connection, however 
remote, a defense. 
Looking to other statutes that define similar terms, the Federal statute governing the 
sending of unsolicited facsimiles, which is known as the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
of 1991 or the "TCPA" is found at 47 U.S.C. § 227. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 provided in the 
Appendix. That statute prohibits the sending of unsolicited advertisements to fax machines. 
Id. That statute implies a similar qualification of preexisting relationship to find liability for 
solicitation. The statute uses the term "established business relationship" and defines it as 
"a prior or existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication between a 
person or entity and a residential subscriber with or without an exchange of consideration, 
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on the basis of an inquiry, application, purchase or transaction by the residential subscriber 
regarding products or services offered by such person or entity, which relationship has not 
been previously terminated by either party." (47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4) (2003) (emphasis 
added)). Although Appellant acknowledges these are different statutes passed by different 
bodies of legislature, they deal with very similar abuses. The definition set by the United 
States in this Federal statute, along with common sense, directly opposes the interpretation 
of the lower court. 
The lower court admits that its "reading of the statutory language excludes from the 
Act's protection a potentially sizeable group of people." See Ct. Rec. p. 512, Mem. f 24. 
It also concedes that "its reading of the Act's language could be questioned as creating an 
outcome the legislature could not have intended." See Ct. Rec. p. 512, Mem. f 25. The 
lower court is correct in this. Actually, the lower court could as well have admitted that its 
interpretation cancels the Statute, by rendering all users of the Internet vulnerable to SPAM. 
Under the lower court's interpretation the Statute has a loophole under which SPAM can 
never be stopped (short of one continually changing email addresses). This cannot be the 
intent of the legislature. Given the more accurate interpretation of the plain language of the 
Statute, people should be able to terminate relationships with SPAMMERS. 
All sides have agreed that Gillman terminated any business relationship with 
GroupLotto on May 14, 2002. See Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second Affidavit of Terry Gillman, 
Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, f 4. 
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At that point, he no longer could be found to have a preexisting relationship with GroupLotto 
or any other party involved because it had been terminated. Any possible business 
relationship he had with GroupLotto before did not continue to exist. It was no longer 
preexisting. Therefore the SPAM email he received advertising Sprint products two days 
later was received unsolicited under the Statute. 
2. Appellant Never Had A Relationship with Sprint-
Mr. Gillman never had a relationship with Sprint. See Ct. Rec. p. 363, Second 
Affidavit of Terry Gillman, Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum in Opposition 
to Summary Judgment, f 7. Mr. Gillman signed up for a membership on Audiogalaxy.com, 
who is unquestionably not Sprint. At that time, according to Sprint, he also agreed to receive 
emails from one of Audiogalaxy's sponsors, GroupLotto. Even if that were so, the 
relationship was undisputedly terminated. At no time did Gillman ever create a relationship 
with Sprint. Notwithstanding the lack of relationship with Sprint, the lower court correctly 
found in its memorandum decision that Sprint was the entity responsible for sending the 
offending email. See Ct. Rec. p. 509, Mem. ffr 11,12. The lower court's decision continues 
to find that "liability attaches under the Act to '[e]ach person who sends or causes to be sent 
an unsolicited commercial email.' § 13-36-103 (emphasis added). By hiring Traffix and its 
subsidiary GroupLotto to advertise on its behalf, Sprint 'caused' the email at issue to be sent 
to Gillman." See Ct. Rec. p. 509, Mem. f 12. 
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The lower court found Sprint to be the liable party, not GroupLotto or Traffix or any 
other party. See Ct. Rec. p. 509, Mem. f 12. This only makes common sense, since the email 
was sent to advertise Sprint services and would not have been sent at all if Sprint had not 
paid to have it sent. Therefore, Sprint is clearly responsible and the Statute clearly targets 
one who "causes it to be sent" as Sprint did here. Nevertheless, the lower court found that 
because Gillman once had a business relationship with GroupLotto, Sprint was clothed with 
vicarious immunity under the Statute because the email was thereby "not unsolicited." See 
Ct. Rec. pp. 511-12, Mem. f 22. With this ruling, the lower court effectively relieved Sprint 
of its liability for causing an unsolicited email to be sent by its hired SPAMMER. The lower 
court allowed Sprint to hire a defense from GroupLotto by acquiring vicariously a 
"preexisting relationship." This inventive and fanciful determination goes well beyond the 
language of the Statute. It is judicial activism and judicial legislating at a breathtaking 
sweep. Section 13-36-103(3) Utah Code Annotated (2002) states, "If the recipient of an 
unsolicited commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email notifies the sender that 
the recipient does not want to receive future commercial email or future sexually explicit 
email, respectively, the sender may not send that recipient a commercial email or a sexually 
explicit email, as the case may be, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate." 
Ut. Code Ann. § 13-36-103(3) (Emphasis added). Just as paragraph 1 creates liability for 
that entity that "sends or causes to be sent" paragraph 3 continues that liability to those who 
directly or through an affiliate (as we have here), send offending emails. Sprint did not 
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directly send the offending email, but its affiliate, GroupLotto, did at Sprint's insistence. 
Gillman never had a relationship with Sprint, and any relationship with GroupLotto had been 
terminated several days before it sent the offending email. Sprint never acquired a 
relationship with Gillman merely by hiring a SPAMMER. Even if it were possible to hire 
a SPAMMER to buy a relationship, that would not work in the facts of this case. Here 
Gillman had terminated whatever relationship once existed. 
3, The Utah Act Must Require A Bona Fide Commercial Relationship. 
The term "preexisting relationship" as used in the Utah Act must require a bona-fide 
commercial relationship as a result of which it would be reasonable to expect to receive 
communications. It should not include merely a purchase of a name from another party as 
we have here. 
Gillman entered Audiogalaxy.com to download music and ended up a member of 
Audiogalaxy. As a result of that membership agreement, the lower court has ruled that he 
is now a target for any SPAMMER for the rest of his natural life as long as some arguable 
connection can be attached to Audiogalaxy. A portion of the Audiogalaxy membership 
agreement allegedly provides that the member agree to receive information and offers from 
GroupLotto. See Ct. Rec. p. 313, Affidavit Kate Vein, f 4. There has been no discovery to 
explore (or prove) that agreement. Nevertheless, the lower court decided without the benefit 
of actual proof or discovery that the alleged relationship between Gillman and GroupLotto 
bars Gillman from any protection under Utah's Statute. This is so even after termination of 
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the only agreement which ever existed. The lower court effectively has concluded that 
GroupLotto now has the right to send Appellant as much email as it wants, even though 
Gillman has requested it not send him any more email. In fact, the decision of the lower 
court makes it so that GroupLotto can now sell Appellant's email address to whatever 
SPAMMER it chooses along with some form of "assignment" and Gillman would have no 
recourse. In effect, the lower court has inexplicably turned the Utah Anti-Spam Statute into 
a mechanism to protect SPAMMERS and to increase the volume of SPAM sent to Utah 
residents. It is the sort of raw judicial activism which should shock any court who feels 
restrained by Legislative action. Clearly what the lower court did could not be the intended 
effect of the Utah Act. Even if there once existed a bona fide business relationship between 
Gillman and Audiogalaxy, this should not open the door to an unlimited supply of SPAM 
from Sprint. Once any bona fide relationship ceased to exist, GroupLotto and all of it's 
affiliates should be barred from sending junk email to Gillman. 
Additionally, although admittedly the email was sent by GroupLotto, the email was 
from Sprint. It advertised Sprint's products. It sought to sell Sprint to Gillman. It targeted 
Gillman specifically because he didn't have a relationship with Sprint. Sprint intended to 
benefit from sending it to Gillman. Sprint caused the email to be sent. It paid for and 
arranged for the email to be sent. Therefore it must be with Sprint that a bona fide 
preexisting business relationship must exist for Sprint to have immunity from liability. Utah 
Code Ann. Section 13-36-103 has three subparts. Every one of the subparts contains 
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language related to those who cause the email to be sent. Section 13-36-103(1) provides: 
"Each person who... causes to be sent" has violated the requirements. Sprint caused this to 
be sent. 13-36-103(2) provides: "A person who... causes to be sent" has violated the 
requirements. Sprint is once again responsible. 13-36-103(3) provides that it is unlawful 
to send this email spam "either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate." Sprint caused 
it to be sent. Sprint remains responsible. Once again the clear provisions of the Statute reach 
Sprint. The lower court made not just seismic, but tectonic changes to the Legislative 
enactment. 
The argument that Sprint contracted with GroupLotto and is thereby shielded from 
liability is an argument that finds no support in the legislation. In fact, that argument is both 
anticipated by and defeated in the language chosen by the legislature. Sprint was the sole 
beneficiary of this email. The only thing GroupLotto received was payment from Sprint, for 
sending a blizzard of emails. It is with GroupLotto that Gillman terminated the alleged 
relationship, not Sprint. But it is Sprint that is liable under the Statute and finding of the 
lower court. It is with Sprint that the court must find a bona fide business relationship that 
is preexisting at the time the email is received. To find that the relationship may be with any 
so called affiliate of GroupLotto is to completely open the door to any SPAMMER to whom 
they sell an email address. That remakes the Utah Statute into the "Utah Pro-Spam Act." 
A curious result indeed. 
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4 Appellant's Motion for Discovery under Rule 56(f) Should Have Been 
Granted. 
The standard for the grant or denial of summary judgment is well known: [Sjummary 
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ut.R.Civ.P. 
56(c). (If the movant bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material 
fact, the nonmovant may not rest on its pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing 
a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of 
proof. See Waddoups v. The Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 P.3d 1054 (Utah 2003). 
An issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier 
of fact could resolve the issue either way. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 
248[, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202] (1986). An issue of fact is "material" if under the 
substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. See id. If a party that 
would bear the burden of persuasion at trial does not come forward with sufficient evidence 
on all essential elements of its prima facie case, all issues concerning all other elements of 
the claim and any defenses become immaterial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 
322-23[, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265] (1986). 
The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie demonstration of the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. 
See Celotex, All U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In so doing, a movant that will not bear the 
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burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the nonmovant's claim. See id. Such a movant 
may make its prima facie demonstration simply by pointing out to the court a lack of 
evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim. See id. If the 
movant carries this initial burden, the nonmovant that would bear the burden of persuasion 
at trial may not simply rest upon its pleadings; the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go 
beyond the pleadings and "set forth specific fact" that would be admissible in evidence in the 
event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant. Ut.R.Civ.P. 
56(e); See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89[, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 
L.Ed.2d 695] (1990); Celotex, All U.S. at 324,106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, All U.S. at 248[, 
106 S.Ct. 2505]. To accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, 
deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein. See Thomas v. Wichita Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.) cert denied, 506 U.S. 1013[, 113 S.Ct. 
635, 121 L.Ed.2d 566] (1992). Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th 
Cir. 1998). 
In this case, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment before either party had 
any opportunity to begin taking discovery. The only evidence supplied was in the form of 
affidavit testimony which could only be seen as self-serving and incomplete. The language 
of Toebleman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016 (3rd Cir. 1942) is 
particularly applicable to the instant case. 
"The case must, therefore, go back for further proceedings as to this cause of 
action in order to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to produce evidence of 
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the facts necessary to support the relief for which they ask. It is obvious that 
this evidence must come largely from the defendants. This case illustrates the 
danger of founding a judgment in favor of one party upon his own version of 
facts within his sole knowledge as set forth in affidavits prepared ex parte. 
Cross-examination of the party and a reasonable examination of his records by 
the other party frequently bring forth further facts which place a very different 
light upon the picture. The plaintiffs should, therefore, be given a reasonable 
opportunity, under proper safeguards, to take the depositions and have the 
discovery which they seek." 
Mat 1022. 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for exactly this type of relief. 
That rule states: 
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just." 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on "numerous occasions that rule 56(f) motions 
opposing a summary judgment motion on the ground that discovery has not been completed 
should be granted liberally unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking in merit." Salt Lake 
County v. Western Dairymen Coop, 48 P.3d 910 (Utah 2002) (citing Price Dev. Co. v. Or em 
City, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000); Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994); and 
Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984)). 
In this case, Plaintiff's Motion was made and filed in October, 2002, discovery was 
not completed, in fact the process was never allowed to begin. See Ct. Rec. pp. 194-99. There 
were no interrogatories, no requests for admission, no requests for production, no 
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depositions. These methods are necessary to flush out the facts and to determine plaintiffs 
claims on the merits, not on the pleadings. The Plaintiff made claims and the Defendant 
made its own claims in opposition creating a situation of "he said, she said." There was no 
flushing out of the facts, none was allowed. 
Discovery would have allowed the parties to determine several material facts, 
including a determination of the actual amount of time and by what process an email message 
to be sent by any Spammer in the industry can be removed from an emailing list, or more 
specifically, the actual amount of time and process an email message sent by GroupLotto 
could by removed from an emailing list, and the existence or non-existence of any business 
relationship between Appellant and Appellee. Additionally, the determination by the lower 
court was based entirely upon the affidavits of the parties. The discovery process would be 
used to verify or contradict the testimony actually submitted. Because there was no 
discovery, there was no opportunity to do so. 
Plaintiff's motion was submitted in a timely fashion, with pertinent rationale and 
necessity. Notwithstanding that and the Utah Supreme Court's many findings that Rule 56(f) 
motions should be granted liberally, in this case, it was not. Appellant respectfully requests 
this Court correct the lower court's error by remanding this matter for further discovery and 
determination. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in every respect in its ruling. It adopted a judicially amended 
Statute which bore no relationship to what the Utah Legislature intended. It did not only 
violence, but effected a reversal of the Statute's effect and intent. It adopts a "safe harbor" 
provision for immunizing SPAMMERS from liability. It stretches the language into such 
distortions and distensions that we have, under the lower court's view, a "Utah Pro-Spam 
Act" in place of what the Legislature was attempting to enact. It ignores common sense, 
statutory language and rudimentary rules of grammar. In short, it fails to pass muster legally, 
grammatically, and 'common-sensically.' 
Further, discovery was essential before making the factual determinations below. 
Discovery was prohibited, in violation of the Rules. Summary Judgment was not 
appropriate. 
DATED this "7 ~ day of October, 2003. 
NELSON^NUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
Denver- (J. Snuffer, Jr. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL, via first class mail, postage prepaid, 
on the following: 
Robert S. Clark 
Paul C. Drecksel 
Justin P. Matkin 
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
185 S. State St., Suite 1300 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
2. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act, Utah Code §§13-
36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002). 
4. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991). 
5. 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(2003). 
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ADDENDUM 1 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY GILLMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON 
DEF SPRINTS MO FO 
Case No: 020406640 
Judge: DENISE P. LINDBERG 
Date: 2/28/2003 
Clerk: lisam 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Sprint's Motion for 
Summary Judgment: Decision and Order: Because the email at issue in 
this case does not fit the statutory defintion of and "unsolicited 
commercial email11 under the plain language of the Act, the Court 
GRANTS Defendant Sprint's motion for summary judgment. So ordered. 
Page 1 
Case No: 020406640 
Date: Mar 04, 2003 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 020406640 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail PAUL C DRECKSEL 
ATTORNEY DEF 
185 SOUTH STATE STREET, 
#1300 
P.O.ST OFFICE BOX 11019 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84147 
Mail JUSTIN P MATKIN 
ATTORNEY DEF 
185 SOUTH STATE ST 
SUITE 1300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Mail CAROLYN B. MCHUGH 
ATTORNEY DEF 
185 SOUTH STATE 
SUITE 1300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Mail DENVER C SNUFFER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
10885 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SANDY UT 84047 
Dated t h i s n day of JftflAfA 20££ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
- ^ 
% 
% 
TERRY GILLMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS 
COMPANY, L.P. and JOHN DOES one 
through ten whose true names are unknown, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER 
ON DEFENDANT SPRINT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 020406640 
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg 
f 1 Before the Court is Defendant Sprint Communications' ("Sprint") motion for summary 
judgment, filed November 1,2002. Defendant's Motion and Plaintiffs Opposition were fully 
briefed and heard, pursuant to notice, on December 10,2002. The parties were represented by 
counsel and, following the motion hearing, each party was granted leave to file a five page 
supplemental memorandum. A Notice to Submit for Decision was filed by Defendant on January 
7,2003. Having fully considered the argument of the parties and the applicable law, the Court 
now GRANTS Sprint's motion for summary judgment. 
\2 Sprint's arguments for summary judgment are based on both statutory and constitutional 
grounds. Recognizing that the court will not rule on the constitutional arguments unless the 
motion cannot be granted on statutory grounds, Sprint offers four statutory grounds in support of 
its claim that it is not liable under Utah's Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email 
Act, Utah Code §§ 13-36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002) (the "Act"), for sending unsolicited 
commercial email ("UCE") to Plaintiff. ^Any one of those statutory arguments, if sustained, 
would be sufficient to resolve the case in Sprint's favor. For the reasons set forth below, three of 
Sprint's statutory arguments are not persuasive. The fourth, however, requires that summary 
judgment be rendered in Sprint's favor. Because the Court grants summary judgment to Sprint 
on statutory grounds, it need not reach Sprint's constitutional arguments.1 See Utah v. Wood, 648 
P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982) (citing Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980)) ("It is a 
fundamental rule that we should avoid addressing a constitutional issue unless required to do 
so.") 
'Sprint claims the Act runs afoul of^e^re^fl'jPouitewiBi Amendments (Freedom of Speech and Due 
Process clauses), as weU^s.^ xeJon^tCbnim^ce clause; 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1f3 On April 14, 2002, plaintiff, Gillman, registered on the Audio Galaxy website and, by so 
doing, agreed to receive promotional email. Through an intermediary, Audio Galaxy sold its 
email addresses to Traffix, Inc. ("Traffix").2 Traffix and its subsidiaries contract with businesses 
to send promotional email to consenting individuals. 
f4 On May 6, 2002, the Act became effective. 
1f5 On or about May 14, 2002, Traffix, Inc., through its subsidiary, GroupLotto, initiated a 
campaign to send promotional email to those addresses it had purchased. The promotional 
emails were intended to advertise Sprint's Nickel Nights long-distance telephone service. 
1f6 That same day, May 14,2002, Gillman requested removal from GroupLottofs email 
distribution list. 
1f7 Gillman's name and email address were actually removed from GroupLotto's email 
distribution list a day later, on May 15,2002. However, they were not immediately removed 
from the queue of emails advertising Sprint's Nickel Nights. As a result, on May 16, 2002, 
Gillman received an email from GroupLotto advertising Sprint's Nickel Nights. 
T[8 On May 28,2002, Gillman filed a class action lawsuit against Sprint, alleging that Sprint 
sent him UCE in violation of the Act. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1f9 The Court may award summary judgment only if the Court finds there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and the Court concludes that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 
1991). The Court must draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 
f 10 Issues of statutory interpretation, as questions of law, are appropriate for summary 
judgment. The Court has a duty to interpret statutes so as to uphold their constitutionality 
whenever possible. See Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464,467 (Utah 
1989) ("If there are alternative statutory constructions possible, one rendering a statute 
2
 There is no evidence before the Court concerning the terms under which Gillman consented to receive 
emails as a result of his enrollment in the Audio Galaxy site, nor as to whether the consent expressly extended to 
subsequent purchasers of Audio Galaxy's email lists. Without information one way or another on this issue, one 
could argue that Audio Galaxy's sale of Gillman's personal information to Traffix and GroupLotto may have been 
an unauthorized act by Audio Galaxy. Notably, Gillman has never raised this issue so it has been waived. To the 
contrary, Gillman concedes his relationship with GroupLotto, but argues that he terminated the relationship before 
the Sprint email was sent. Indeed, in order to attempt to hold Sprint legally liable in this case, Gillman has no 
choice but to rely on the agency relationship between GroupLotto and Sprint 
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constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the former should be adopted."). 
ANALYSIS 
1fl 1 Sprint's four statutory arguments dispute liability on the grounds that: (a) Sprint itself was 
not the entity that sent the email; (b) the email was sent accidentally; (c) Plaintiff consented to 
receipt of the email; and (d) Plaintiff had a pre-existing relationship with GroupLotto, the actual 
sender of the email. 
1J12 Sprint's first argument is wrong as a matter of law. While it is true that the email was 
sent by GroupLotto rather than by Sprint itself, liability attaches under the Act to ,f[e]ach person 
who sends or causes to be sent an unsolicited commercial email." § 13-36-103 (emphasis 
added). By hiring Traffix and its subsidiary GroupLotto to advertise on its behalf, Sprint 
"caused" the email at issue to be sent to Gillman. 
f 13 Sprint's second argument, that transmitting the subject email was unintentional, places 
material issues of fact in dispute; accordingly, it is not an appropriate ground for summary 
judgment. Because Gillman had previously agreed to receive commercial advertisement, 
GroupLotto, at Sprint's behest, identified Gillman as one of a group of intended recipients of the 
Sprint advertisement. Webster's New World Dictionary (2d coll. ed. 1986) defines "intentional" 
as an act that is "done with intent," and "done purposely." "Intention" is further defined, inter 
aha, as "a determination to do a specified thing"; "the general word implying having something 
in mind as a plan or design." Id. Cf. Utah Code §76-2-103 (in criminal context, one acts 
intentionally when it is his conscious objective to engage in the conduct or cause the result). 
There is no dispute that GroupLotto disenrolled Gillman from its list of consenting recipients the 
day before the offending email was transmitted. The issue is why Gillman's name and email 
were not simultaneously deleted from the queue. As a result, the following material issues of fact 
are in dispute: 
(A) Whether the queue of the Sprint advertisements was actually assembled prior to, or 
subsequent to, receipt of Gillman's disenrollment request. 
(B) If the advertisement queue was assembled prior to receipt of the disenrollment 
request, whether GroupLotto intentionally decided not to incur the costs of removing 
Gillman's name and email from the pre-established queue for the Nickel Nights 
advertisement. And, if so, whether Sprint should be liable for that decision. 
(C) Whether technological limits made it impossible to remove Gillman's name and 
email from the already established queue (which, under the right set of facts could 
support the claim that transmission of the advertising email to Gillman should be legally 
construed to be "unintentional"). 
Tfl4 Sprint's third argument, that Gillman consented to receipt of the email, also raises 
material, disputed issues of fact precluding entry of summary judgment. Sprint correctly argues 
that "[t]he statute says nothing about e-mails sent before a withdrawal of consent has been 
received by the sender." Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment [Revised], at 3. From that premise Sprint argues that "the Act must be read to provide 
for a reasonable period of time following the withdrawal of permission during which the 
previously sent messages may be delivered without liability attaching to the sender." Id. Of 
course, the facts of this case do not correspond to Sprint's argument since the 
sender-GroupLotto-in fact received and processed the disenrollment request a day before the 
offending email was actually transmitted to Gillman. Sprint's argument rests on the premise that 
once an email is in the queue it has been "sent." There are no facts before the Court to support 
that claim. All that Sprint has argued in its brief is that it is common in the industry for a 
disenrollment request to take 2-3 days to process. That does not answer the question whether it 
was reasonable for GroupLotto not to purge the email to Gillman from the advertising queue, 
given that in this case GroupLotto was able to purge Gillman from its list of subscribers in 
advance of the email's transmission.3 
HI 5 In addition to the above-referenced material issues of fact in dispute, there are several 
legal issues that have yet to be fully addressed by the parties. For example, the parties have 
provided no legal analysis as to when, under the facts of this case, a commercial email should be 
deemed "sent," or what legal considerations militate in favor, or against, construing the Act to 
permit a "reasonable period" of disenrollment irrespective of actual technical capabilities. Each 
of these issues bears directly on the question whether Gillman's consent could have been legally 
withdrawn with respect to advertisements that were then in the queue. Consequently, summary 
judgment for Sprint cannot be granted on any of the preceding grounds. 
1J16 Although the first three statutory arguments fail to support entry of summary judgment in 
Sprint's behalf, the Court agrees that summary judgment is appropriate as to the fourth statutory 
ground. Sprint's final argument is that the email at issue did not violate the Act because it fell 
within the Act's "preexisting business relationship" exception. Specifically, Sprint relies on 
Gillman's preexisting business relationship with GroupLotto to argue that the email was, by 
definition, not "unsolicited." 
1(17 Among other things, the Act proscribes the sending of "unsolicited" commercial emails if 
they do not comply with the Act's requirements. A commercial email is "unsolicited" if it is 
received "without the recipient's express permission." § 13-36-102(8)(a). However, "[a] 
commercial email is not 'unsolicited1 if the sender has a preexisting business or personal 
relationship with the sender." Id. § (b) (emphasis added). Gillman does not dispute that he had 
a preexisting business relationship with GroupLotto. As Sprint's agent, expressly hired to 
disseminate Sprint's Nickel-Nights advertising campaign, GroupLotto's relationship to Gillman 
is properly imputed to Sprint. 
T[l 8 Gillman claims that Sprint's message was "unsolicited" because he had disenrolled 
before the email was sent. From that premise Gillman argues that Sprint is liable, under the Act, 
3As noted previously, the parties have also not addressed the technological feasibility of 
"instantaneous"disenrollment nor ihe^sdciated economic costs, 
because the commercial email message failed to comply with the Act's express requirements. 
The plain language of the Act renders Gillman's argument unavailing. 
1f 19 "A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed 
according to their plain language." Arndt v. First Interstate Bank, 991 P.2d 584, 586,1999 UT 
91 f 10 (quoting O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998)). 
ff[W]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the statute's 
plain meaning to divine legislative intent." Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 
1168 (Utah 1991). See also Olson v. SamuelMclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998) 
("We do not look beyond the plain language unless we find ambiguity"). 
1f20 Here, the Act provides that "[i]f the recipient of an unsolicited commercial email... 
notifies the sender that the recipient does not want to receive future commercial email... from 
the sender, the sender may not send that recipient a commercial email... either directly or 
through a subsidiary." §13-36-103(3) (emphasis added). Because a commercial email is, by 
definition, not "unsolicited" if it is based on a preexisting business relationship, this subsection 
only applies to prohibit the sending of a second (or subsequent) unsolicited email to recipients 
with whom the merchant or advertiser did not have a preexisting business relationship. 
1J21 The Act is silent as to how a recipient like Gillman, who indisputably had a preexisting 
business relationship with the commercial email sender, can effectively terminate that 
relationship in order to claim the protection of the Act. By definition, to "preexist" means "to 
exist previously or before." Webster's New World Dictionary (2d coll. ed. 1986). Thus, a 
relationship between two parties can "preexist" if it existed at any time in the past, even if that 
relationship has been subsequently terminated.4 That is true irrespective of when in time that 
relationship existed. Thus, Gillman continued to have a preexisting business relationship with 
GroupLotto. 
%L2 Because of Gillman's preexisting business relationship with GroupLotto, the email 
Gillman received was, by definition, not unsolicited. Under the Act, recipients of unwanted 
commercial email can only disenroll themselves if the email received is an "unsolicited 
commercial email." § 13-36-103(3). The Court concludes that, for purposes of the Act, 
Gillman's attempt to disenroll himself-and thus terminate (he business relationship with 
4
 The legislature is presumed to use language in its common and ordinary meaning. Thus, unless the 
legislature expressly defines the terms or phrases it uses in its enactments, the Court will interpret those terms or 
phrases as generally understood. In common usage, a"preexisting business relationship" clearly encompasses not 
only present business relationships but also any such relationship that may have existed at some point in the past, 
even if it no longer exists. Thus, persons have preexisting business relationships with former landlords or 
employers, even if those relationships no longer exist. Had the legislature intended to limit the application of the 
definition to a presently existing business relationship, it would have qualified its language to set a time limit to the 
relationship. Not having done so, this Court would be overstepping its authority to impute a time limitation to the 
language the legislature adopted. Sec Assoc. Gen. Contrs. v. Bd. of OH Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112KBQ, 38 P.3d 
291, 301n(When statutory language is unambiguous, the Court is not at liberty to "infer substantive tenns into the 
text that are not already there"), quoting Berrett v. Purser &JEdyyards> 876 P*2d |67,370 (Utah X99$$eealsoJn 
re I.M.L. v. Utah;2Q02 UTJimi25,rrjM —. 
GroupLotto and Sprint-was ineffective. 
1f23 Gillman's claim that the Nickel Nights advertisement did not comply with the Act's 
requirements that commercial emails include specific language in the subject line is also 
unavailing. By its terms, those requirements also apply only to "unsolicited commercial 
emailfs]," see Utah Code §13-36-103(l)(a), (b), (c), and (d) (2002). Thus, the fact that the email 
message received by Gillman did not comply with those requirements does not trigger liability 
for GroupLotto or Sprint.5 
Tf24 To be sure, this reading of the statutory language excludes from the Act's protection a 
potentially sizeable group of people. Given the unqualified nature of the Act's language, the 
exclusion precludes any challenges under the Act that are brought by commercial email 
recipients who have had any prior business relationship with the sender. 
K25 The Court concedes that its reading of the Act's language could be questioned as creating 
an outcome the legislature could not have intended. As noted previously, however, the best 
evidence of legislative intent is the language the legislature enacted into law. Further, the Court 
is precluded from examining other indicators of legislative intent if, as is the case here, the 
language is unambiguous.6 If the Court's interpretation of the Act's language does not adequately 
reflect the legislature's intentions, the legislature is better positioned than this Court to determine 
whether the statutory language should be clarified. 
5Gillman makes no claims under §13-36-103(2), but the same analysis would apply to bar liability under 
the Act in cases where a recipient with a "preexisting business relationship" to a commercial email sender 
complained of improper use of another's domain name, or misrepresentation of point of origin of an email message. 
6Although the Court rests its holding squarely on the statutory language, there are reasonable bases to 
believe this outcome is not inconsistent with the statutory scheme. Legislatures have the discretion to address 
identified problems, such as the problem of "spammers," one step at a time. Thus, even if the scheme adopted by 
the legislature does not eliminate all unwanted commercial email, the drafters of the Act may have viewed it as an 
important "first step" in addressing the issue, with further steps to follow. That is an especially plausible argument 
in cases where, as here, die legislature is venturing into a relatively new and judicially untested area of legislation. 
It is also possible that the drafters may have intentionally structured the Apt's language as part of a legislative 
compromise, in order tb secure its passage. In any event, this Court will not second-guess the legislature when the 
statutory language is slear. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
%26 Because the email at issue in this case does not fit the statutory definition of an 
"unsolicited commercial email" under the plain language of the Act, the Court GRANTS 
Defendant Sprint's motion for summary judgment. So ordered. 
This 28th day of February, 2003. By the Court: 
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trial juror in the trial of a civil action. Such objections must be 
heard and disposed of by the court in the same manner as a 
motion. 
PART VEL JUDGMENT 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules 
includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A 
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of 
a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multi-
ple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in 
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, 
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of 
judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, 
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the 
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other 
form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights 
and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a 
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall 
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of 
several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on 
each side as between or among themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not 
be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically 
prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision 
therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs 
of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal 
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determi-
nation of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers 
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by 
law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must 
within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a 
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disburse-
ments in the action, and file with the court a like memoran-
dum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge 
the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been 
necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party 
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days 
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have 
the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the judgment was 
rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or 
at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of 
judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed 
on the date judgment is entered. 
(d)(3) [Deleted.] 
(d)(4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The 
clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any interest 
on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and 
the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The 
clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, 
insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for 
that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the 
register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for 
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as 
follows: 
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk 
shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against 
the defendant if: 
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to ap-
pear; 
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent 
person; 
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursu-
ant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum 
certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation. 
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a 
judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into 
effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment 
by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, 
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references 
as it deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court 
may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default 
has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with 
Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counter claimants, cross-claimants. The provi-
sions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the 
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a 
party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all 
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of 
Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. 
No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of 
Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the 
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or with-
out supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judg-
ment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as 
to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memo-
randa and affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance 
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with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be ren-
dered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under 
this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for 
all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if prac-
ticable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good 
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specify-
ing the facts that appear without substantial controversy, 
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceed-
ings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial 
shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, 
if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from 
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment 
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained 
or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the 
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits 
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the 
affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursu-
ant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, shall be in 
accordance with these rules, and the right to trial by jury may 
be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner 
provided in Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another ade-
quate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory 
relief in cases where it is appropriate. The court may order a 
speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and 
may advance it on the calendar. 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court 
otherwise directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), 
judgment upon the verdict of a jury shall be forthwith signed 
by the clerk and filed. If there is a special verdict or a general 
verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned 
by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the 
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the 
clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdi-
vision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judg-
ments shall be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions 
and judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be 
deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien 
on real property, when the same is signed and filed as herein 
above provided. The clerk shall immediately make a notation 
of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment 
docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. A copy of the 
signed judgment shall be promptly served by the party pre-
paring it in the manner provided in Rule 5. The time for filing 
a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement of this 
provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a 
verdict or decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, 
judgment may nevertheless be rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by con-
fession is authorized by statute, the party seeking the same 
must file with the clerk of the court in which the judgment is 
to be entered a statement, verified by the defendant, to the 
following effect: 
(f)(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to 
become due, it shall concisely state the claim and that the sum 
confessed therefor is justly due or to become due; 
(f)(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of 
securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must 
state concisely the claim and that the sum confessed therefor 
does not exceed the same; 
(f)(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified 
sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and 
enter in the judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the 
amount confessed, with costs of entry, if any. 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment. 
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judgment may be 
satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any or all of the judgment 
debtors, by the owner thereof, or by the attorney of record of 
the judgment creditor where no assignment of the judgment 
has been filed and such attorney executes such satisfaction 
within eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the 
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly acknowl-
edged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by acknowledgment of 
such satisfaction signed by the owner or attorney and entered 
on the docket of the judgment in the county where first 
docketed, with the date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. 
Every satisfaction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or 
more of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid 
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming them. 
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judgment shall 
have been fully paid and not satisfied of record, or when the 
satisfaction of judgment shall have been lost, the court in 
which such judgment was recovered may, upon motion and 
satisfactory proof, authorize the attorney of the judgment 
creditor to satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring 
the same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered upon 
the docket. 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction of judg-
ment, duly executed and acknowledged, the clerk shall file the 
same with the papers in the case, and enter it on the register 
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(5) whether the franchisees of the same line-make in 
that relevant market area are providing adequate service 
to consumers for the powersport vehicles of the line-make, 
which shall include the adequacy of the powersport vehi-
cle sale and service facilities, equipment, supply of vehicle 
parts, and qualified service personnel. 2002 
13-35-307. Franchisor's repurchase obligations upon 
termination or noncontinuation of franchise. 
(1) Upon the termination or noncontinuation of a franchise 
by the franchisor, the franchisor shall pay the franchisee: 
(a) the franchisee's cost of new, undamaged, and unsold 
powersport vehicles in the franchisee's inventory acquired 
from the franchisor or another franchisee of the same 
line-make representing both the current model year at 
the time of termination or noncontinuation and the im-
mediately prior model year vehicles: 
(i) plus any charges made by the franchisor, for 
distribution, delivery, or taxes; 
(ii) plus the franchisee's cost of any accessories 
added on the vehicle shall be repurchased; and 
(iii) less all allowances paid or credited to the 
franchisee by the franchisor; 
(b) the cost of all new, undamaged, and unsold sup-
plies, parts, and accessories as set forth in the franchisor's 
catalog at the time of termination or noncontinuation for 
the supplies, parts, and accessories, less all allowances 
paid or credited to the franchisee by the franchisor; 
(c) the fair market value, but not less than the franchi-
see's depreciated acquisition cost of each undamaged sign 
owned by the franchisee that bears a common name, trade 
name, or trademark of the franchisor if acquisition of the 
sign was recommended or required by the franchisor. If a 
franchisee has a sign with multiple manufacturers listed, 
the franchisor is only responsible for its pro rata portion of 
the sign; 
(d) the fair market value, but not less than the fran-
chisee's depreciated acquisition cost of all special tools, 
equipment, and furnishings acquired from the franchisor 
or sources approved by the franchisor that were recom-
mended or required by the franchisor and are in good and 
usable condition; and 
(e) the cost of transporting, handling, packing, and 
loading powersport vehicles, supplies, parts, accessories, 
signs, special tools, equipment, and furnishings. 
(2) The franchisor shall pay the franchisee the amounts 
specified in Subsection (1) within 90 days after the tender of 
the property to the franchisor if the franchisee: 
(a) has clear title to the property; and 
(b) is in a position to convey title to the franchisor. 
(3) If repurchased inventory and equipment are subject to a 
security interest, the franchisor may make payment jointly to 
the franchisee and to the holder of the security interest. 2002 
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ages — Costs and attorney fees — Defense. 
13-36-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the 'Unsolicited Commercial and 
Sexually Explicit Email Act." 2002 
13-36-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Commercial" means for the purpose of promoting 
the sale, lease, or exchange of goods, services, or real 
property. 
(2) "Computer network" means two or more computers 
that are interconnected to exchange electronic messages, 
files, data, or other information. 
(3) "Email" means an electronic message, file, data, or 
other information that is transmitted: 
(a) between two or more computers, computer net-
works, or electronic terminals; or 
(b) within a computer network. 
(4) "Email address" means a destination, commonly 
expressed as a string of characters, to which email may be 
sent or delivered. 
(5) "Email service provider" means a person that: 
(a) is an intermediary in the transmission of email 
from the sender to the recipient; or 
(b) provides to end users of email service the 
ability to send and receive email. 
(6) "Internet domain name" means a globally unique, 
hierarchical reference to an Internet host or service, 
assigned through centralized Internet authorities, com-
prising a series of character strings separated by periods, 
with the right-most string specifying the top of the hier-
archy. 
(7) (a) "Sexually explicit email" means an email that 
contains, promotes, or contains an electronic link to 
material that is harmful to minors, as defined in 
Section 76-10-1201. 
(b) An email is a "sexually explicit email" if it 
meets the definition in Subsection (7)(a), even if the 
email also meets the definition of a commercial email. 
(8) (a) "Unsolicited" means without the recipient's ex-
press permission, except as provided in Subsection 
(8Kb). 
(b) A commercial email is not "unsolicited" if the 
sender has a preexisting business or personal rela-
tionship with the recipient. 2002 
13-36-103. Unsolicited commercial or sexually explicit 
email — Requirements. 
(1) Each person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolic-
ited commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email 
through the intermediary of an email service provider located 
in the state or to an email address held by a resident of the 
state shall: 
(a) conspicuously state in the email the sender's: 
(i) legal name; 
(ii) correct street address; and 
(iii) valid Internet domain name; 
(b) include in the email a subject line that contains: 
(i) for a commercial email, "ADV:" as the first four 
characters; or 
(ii) for a sexually explicit email, "ADV:ADULT" as 
the first nine characters; 
(c) provide the recipient a convenient, no-cost mecha-
nism to notify the sender not to send any future email to 
the recipient, including: 
(i) return email to a valid, functioning return elec-
tronic address; and 
(ii) for a sexually explicit email and if the sender 
has a toll-free telephone number, the sender's toll-
free telephone number; and 
(d) conspicuously provide in the text of the email a 
notice that: 
(i) informs the recipient that the recipient may 
conveniently and at no cost be excluded from future 
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commercial or sexually explicit email, as the case 
may be, from the sender; and 
(ii) for a sexually explicit email and if the sender 
has a toll-free telephone number, includes the send-
er's valid, toll-free telephone number tha t the recipi-
ent may call to be excluded from future email from 
the sender. 
(2) A person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolicited 
commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email 
through the intermediary of an email service provider located 
in the state or to an email address held by a resident of the 
state may not: 
(a) use a third party's Internet domain name in identi-
fying the point of origin or in stating the transmission 
path of the email without the third party's consent; 
(b) misrepresent any information in identifying the 
point of origin or the transmission path of the email; or 
(c) fail to include in the email the information neces-
sary to identify the point of origin of the email. 
(3) If the recipient of an unsolicited commercial email or an 
unsolicited sexually explicit email notifies the sender tha t the 
recipient does not want to receive future commercial email or 
future sexually explicit email, respectively, from the sender, 
the sender may not send that recipient a commercial email or 
a sexually explicit email, as the case may be, either directly or 
through a subsidiary or affiliate. 2002 
13-36-104. Criminal penalty. 
(1) A person who violates any requirement of Section 13-
36-103 with respect to an unsolicited sexually explicit email is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) A criminal conviction or a penalty assessed as a result of 
a criminal conviction under Subsection (1) does not relieve the 
person convicted or assessed from civil liability in an action 
under Section 13-36-105. 2002 
13-36-105. Civil action for violation — Election on 
damages — Costs and attorney fees — De-
fense. 
(1) For any violation of a provision of Section 13-36-103, an 
action may be brought by: 
(a) a person who received the unsolicited commercial 
email or unsolicited sexually explicit email with respect to 
which the violation under Section 13-36-103 occurred; or 
(b) an email service provider through whose facilities 
the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexually 
explicit email was transmitted. 
(2) In each action under Subsection (1): 
(a) a recipient or email service provider may: 
(i) recover actual damages; or 
(ii) elect, in lieu of actual damages, to recover the 
lesser of: 
(A) $10 per unsolicited commercial email or 
unsolicited sexually explicit email received by 
the recipient or t ransmitted through the email 
service provider; or 
(B) $25,000 per day tha t the violation occurs; 
and 
(b) each prevailing recipient or email service provider 
shall be awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
(3) An email service provider does not violate Section 13-
36-103 solely by being an intermediary between the sender 
and recipient in the transmission of an email tha t violates 
that section. 
(4) The violation of Section 13-36-103 by an employee does 
not subject the employee's employer to liability under that 
section if the employee's violation of Section 13-36-103 is also 
a violation of an established policy of the employer that 
requires compliance with the requirements of Section 13-36-
103. 
(5) It is a defense to an action brought under this section 
that the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexually 
explicit email was transmitted accidentally. 2002 
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P A R T I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS [EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 
2004] 
13-37-101. Title [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004]. 
This chapter is known as the "Notice of Intent to Sell 
Nonpublic Personal Information Act." 2003 
13-37-102. Definit ions [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004]. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means a person that controls, is con-
trolled by, or is under common control with: 
(a) a commercial entity; and 
(b) (i) directly; or 
(ii) indirectly through one or more intermedi-
aries. 
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (2)(b), "commercial en-
tity" means a person that : 
(i) has an office or other place of business 
located in the state; and 
(ii) in the ordinary course of business t rans-
acts a consumer transaction in this state. 
(b) "Commercial entity" does not include: 
(i) a governmental entity; or 
(ii) an entity providing services on behalf of a 
governmental entity. 
(3) "Compensation" means anything of economic value 
tha t is paid or transferred to a commercial entity for or in 
direct consideration of the disclosure of nonpublic per-
sonal information. 
(4) (a) "Consumer transaction" means: 
(i) a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, 
or other written or oral transfer or disposition: 
(A) that is initiated or completed in this 
state; and 
(B) of: 
(I) goods; 
(II) services; or 
(III) other tangible or intangible 
property, except securities and insur-
ance or services related thereto; or 
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47 U.S.C. § 227. R e s t r i c t i o n s on use of te lephone equipment 
(a) D e f i n i t i o n s 
As used in this section — 
(1) The term "automatic telephone dialing system" means 
equipment which has the capacity — 
(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using 
a random or sequential number generator; and 
(B) to dial such numbers. 
(2) The term "telephone facsimile machine" means equipment 
which has the capacity (A) to transcribe text or images, or both, 
from paper into an electronic signal and to transmit that signal 
over a regular telephone line, or (B) to transcribe text or 
images (or both) from an electronic signal received over a 
regular telephone line onto paper. 
(3) The term "telephone solicitation" means the initiation of 
a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the 
purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or 
services, which is transmitted to any person, but such term does 
not include a call or message (A) to any person with that 
person's prior express invitation or permission, (B) to any 
person with whom the caller has an established business 
relationship, or (C) by a tax exempt nonprofit organization. 
(4) The term "unsolicited advertisement" means any material 
advertising the commercial availability or quality of any 
property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person 
without that person's prior express invitation or permission. 
(b) Restrictions on use of automated telephone equipment 
(1) Prohibitions 
It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States — 
(A) to make any call (other than a call made for emergency 
purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called 
party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an 
artificial or prerecorded voice — 
(i) to any emergency telephone line (including any "911" 
line and any emergency line of a hospital, medical physician 
or service office, health care facility, poison control 
center, or fire protection or law enforcement agency); 
(ii) to the telephone line of any guest room or patient 
room of a hospital, health care facility, elderly home, or 
similar establishment; or 
(iii) to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, 
cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, 
or other radio common carrier service, or any service for 
which the called party is charged for the call; 
(B) to initiate any telephone call to any residential 
telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to 
deliver a message without the prior express consent of the 
called party, unless the call is initiated for emergency 
purposes or is exempted by rule or order by the Commission 
under paragraph (2)(B); 
(C) to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or 
other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a 
telephone facsimile machine; or 
(D) to use an automatic telephone dialing system in such a 
way that two or more telephone lines of a multi-line business 
are engaged simultaneously. 
(2) Regulations; exemptions and other provisions 
The Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement the 
requirements of this subsection. In implementing the 
requirements of this subsection, the Commission — 
(A) shall consider prescribing regulations to allow 
businesses to avoid receiving calls made using an artificial or 
prerecorded voice to which they have not given their prior 
express consent; 
(B) may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of 
paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, subject to such conditions 
as the Commission .may prescribe — 
(i) calls that are not made for a commercial purpose; and 
(ii) such classes or categories of calls made for 
commercial purposes as the Commission determines -
(I) will not adversely affect the privacy rights that 
this section is intended to protect; and 
(II) do not include the transmission of any unsolicited 
advertisement; and 
(C) may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of 
paragraph (1)(A)(iii) of this subsection calls to a telephone 
number assigned to a cellular telephone service that are not 
charged to the called party, subject to such conditions as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary in the interest of the 
privacy rights this section is intended to protect. 
(3) Private right of action 
A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or 
rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that 
State -
(A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the 
regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such 
violation, 
(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a 
violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such 
violation, whichever is greater, or 
(C) both such actions. 
If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly 
violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this 
subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount 
of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the 
amount available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 
(1) Rulemaking proceeding required 
Within 120 days after December 20, 1991, the Commission shall 
initiate a rulemaking proceeding concerning the need to protect 
residential telephone subscribers' privacy rights to avoid 
receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. The 
proceeding shall — 
(A) compare and evaluate alternative methods and procedures 
(including the use of electronic databases, telephone network 
technologies, special directory markings, industry-based or 
company-specific "do not call" systems, and any other 
alternatives, individually or in combination) for their 
effectiveness in protecting such privacy rights, and in terms 
of their cost and other advantages and disadvantages; 
(B) evaluate the categories of public and private entities 
that would have the capacity to establish and administer such 
methods and procedures; 
(C) consider whether different methods and procedures may 
apply for local telephone solicitations, such as local 
telephone solicitations of small businesses or holders of 
second class mail permits; 
(D) consider whether there is a need for additional 
Commission authority to further restrict telephone 
solicitations, including those calls exempted under subsection 
(a)(3) of this section, and, if such a finding is made and 
supported by the record, propose specific restrictions to the 
Congress; and 
(E) develop proposed regulations to implement the methods and 
procedures that the Commission determines are most effective 
and efficient to accomplish the purposes of this section. 
(2) Regulations 
Not later than 9 months after December 20, 1991, the Commission 
shall conclude the rulemaking proceeding initiated under 
paragraph (1) and shall prescribe regulations to implement 
methods and procedures for protecting the privacy rights 
described in such paragraph in an efficient, effective, and 
economic manner and without the imposition of any additional 
charge to telephone subscribers. 
(3) Use of database permitted 
The regulations required by paragraph (2) may require the 
establishment and operation of a single national database to 
compile a list of telephone numbers of residential subscribers 
who object to receiving telephone solicitations, and to make that 
compiled list and parts thereof available for purchase. If the 
Commission determines to require such a database, such 
regulations shall — 
(A) specify a method by which the Commission will select an 
entity to administer such database; 
(B) require each common carrier providing telephone exchange 
service, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the 
Commission, to inform subscribers for telephone exchange 
service of the opportunity to provide notification, in 
accordance with regulations established under this paragraph, 
that such subscriber objects to receiving telephone 
solicitations; 
(C) specify the methods by which each telephone subscriber 
shall be informed, by the common carrier that provides local 
right to give or revoke a notification of an objection under 
subparagraph (A), and (ii) the methods by which such right may 
be exercised by the subscriber; 
(D) specify the methods by which such objections shall be 
collected and added to the database; 
(E) prohibit any residential subscriber from being charged 
for giving or revoking such notification or for being included 
in a database compiled under this section; 
(F) prohibit any person from making or transmitting a 
telephone solicitation to the telephone number of any 
subscriber included in such database; 
(G) specify (i) the methods by which any person desiring to 
make or transmit telephone solicitations will obtain access to 
the database, by area code or local exchange prefix, as 
required to avoid calling the telephone numbers of subscribers 
included in such database; and (ii) the costs to be recovered 
from such persons; 
(H) specify the methods for recovering, from persons 
accessing such database, the costs involved in identifying, 
collecting, updating, disseminating, and selling, and other 
activities relating to, the operations of the database that are 
incurred by the entities carrying out those activities; 
(I) specify the frequency with which such database will be 
updated and specify the method by which such updating will take 
effect for purposes of compliance with the regulations 
prescribed under this subsection; 
(J) be designed to enable States to use the database 
mechanism selected by the Commission for purposes of 
administering or enforcing State law; 
(K) prohibit the use of such database for any purpose other 
than compliance with the requirements of this section and any 
such State law and specify methods for protection of the 
privacy rights of persons whose numbers are included in such 
database; and 
(L) require each common carrier providing services to any 
person for the purpose of making telephone solicitations to 
notify such person of the requirements of this section and the 
regulations thereunder. 
(4) Considerations required for use of database method 
If the Commission determines to require the database mechanism 
described in paragraph (3), the Commission shall — 
(A) in developing procedures for gaining access to the 
database, consider the different needs of telemarketers 
conducting business on a national, regional, State, or local 
level; 
(B) develop a fee schedule or price structure for recouping 
the cost of such database that recognizes such differences and -
(i) reflect the relative costs of providing a national, 
regional, State, or local list of phone numbers of 
subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations; 
(ii) reflect the relative costs of providing such lists on 
paper or electronic media; and 
(iii) not place an unreasonable financial burden on small 
businesses; and 
(C) consider (i) whether the needs of telemarketers operating 
on a local basis could be met through special markings of area 
white pages directories, and (ii) if such directories are 
needed as an adjunct to database lists prepared by area code 
and local exchange prefix. 
(5) Private right of action 
A person who has received more than one telephone call within 
any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in 
violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection 
may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a 
State bring in an appropriate court of that State — 
(A) an action based on a violation of the regulations 
prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, 
(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a 
violation, or to receive up to $500 in damages for each such 
violation, whichever is greater, or 
(C) both such actions. 
It shall be an affirmative defense in any action brought under 
this paragraph that the defendant has established and 
implemented, with due care, reasonable practices and procedures 
to effectively prevent telephone solicitations in violation of 
the regulations prescribed under this subsection. If the court 
finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated the 
regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in 
its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount 
equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under 
subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 
(6) Relation to subsection (b) 
The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to 
permit a communication prohibited by subsection (b) of this 
section. 
(d) Technical and procedural standards 
(1) Prohibition 
It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States -
(A) to initiate any communication using a telephone facsimile 
machine, or to make any telephone call using any automatic 
telephone dialing system, that does not comply with the 
technical and procedural standards prescribed under this 
subsection, or to use any telephone facsimile machine or 
automatic telephone dialing system in a manner that does not 
comply with such standards; or 
(B) to use a computer or other electronic device to send any 
message via a telephone facsimile machine unless such person 
clearly marks, in a margin at the top or bottom of each 
transmitted page of the message or on the first page of the 
transmission, the date and time it is sent and an 
identification of the business, other entity, or individual 
sending the message and the telephone number of the sending 
machine or of such business, other entity, or individual. 
(2) Telephone facsimile machines 
The Commission shall revise the regulations setting technical 
and procedural standards for telephone facsimile machines to 
require that any such machine which is manufactured after one 
year after December 20, 1991, clearly marks, in a margin at the 
top or bottom of each transmitted page or on the first page of 
the business, other entity, or individual sending the message, 
and the telephone number of the sending machine or of such 
business, other entity, or individual. 
(3) Artificial or prerecorded voice systems 
The Commission shall prescribe technical and procedural 
standards for systems that are used to transmit any artificial or 
prerecorded voice message via telephone. Such standards shall 
require that — 
(A) all artificial or prerecorded telephone messages (i) 
shall, at the beginning of the message, state clearly the 
identity of the business, individual, or other entity 
initiating the call, and (ii) shall, during or after the 
message, state clearly the telephone number or address of such 
business, other entity, or individual; and 
(B) any such system will automatically release the called 
party's line within 5 seconds of the time notification is 
transmitted to the system that the called party has hung up, to 
allow the called party's line to be used to make or receive 
other calls. 
(e) Effect on State law 
(1) State law not preempted 
Except for the standards prescribed under subsection (d) of 
this section and subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, 
nothing in this section or in the regulations prescribed under 
this section shall preempt any State law that imposes more 
restrictive intrastate requirements or regulations on, or which 
prohibits — 
(A) the use of telephone facsimile machines or other 
electronic devices to send unsolicited advertisements; 
(B) the use of automatic telephone dialing systems; 
(C) the use of artificial or prerecorded voice messages; or 
(D) the making of telephone solicitations. 
(2) State use of databases 
If, pursuant to subsection (c)(3) of this section, the 
Commission requires the establishment of a single national 
database of telephone numbers of subscribers who object to 
receiving telephone solicitations, a State or local authority may 
not, in its regulation of telephone solicitations, require the 
use of any database, list, or listing system that does not 
include the part of such single national database that relates to 
such State. 
(f) Actions by States 
(1) Authority of States 
Whenever the attorney general of a State, or an official or 
agency designated by a State, has reason to believe that any 
person has engaged or is engaging in a pattern or practice of 
telephone calls or other transmissions to residents of that State 
in violation of this section or the regulations prescribed under 
this section, the State may bring a civil action on behalf of its 
residents to enjoin such calls, an action to recover for actual 
monetary loss or receive $500 in damages for each violation, or 
both such actions. If the court finds the defendant willfully or 
knowingly violated such regulations, the court may, in its 
^iorrpfion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal 
sentence. 
(2) Exclusive jurisdiction of Federal courts 
The district courts of the United States, the United States 
courts of any territory, and the District Court of the United 
States for the District of Columbia shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over all civil actions brought under this 
subsection. Upon proper application, such courts shall also have 
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, or orders affording like 
relief, commanding the defendant to comply with the provisions of 
this section or regulations prescribed under this section, 
including the requirement that the defendant take such action as 
is necessary to remove the danger of such violation. Upon a 
proper showing, a permanent or temporary injunction or 
restraining order shall be granted without bond. 
(3) Rights of Commission 
The State shall serve prior written notice of any such civil 
action upon the Commission and provide the Commission with a copy 
of its complaint, except in any case where such prior notice is 
not feasible, in which case the State shall serve such notice 
immediately upon instituting such action. The Commission shall 
have the right (A) to intervene in the action, (B) upon so 
intervening, to be heard on all matters arising therein, and (C) 
to file petitions for appeal. 
(4) Venue; service of process 
Any civil action brought under this subsection in a district 
court of the United States may be brought in the district wherein 
the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business 
or wherein the violation occurred or is occurring, and process in 
such cases may be served in any district in which the defendant 
is an inhabitant or where the defendant may be found. 
(5) Investigatory powers 
For purposes of bringing any civil action under this 
subsection, nothing in this section shall prevent the attorney 
general of a State, or an official or agency designated by a 
State, from exercising the powers conferred on the attorney 
general or such official by the laws of such State to conduct 
investigations or to administer oaths or affirmations or to 
compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of 
documentary and other evidence. 
(6) Effect on State court proceedings 
Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to 
prohibit an authorized State official from proceeding in State 
court on the basis of an alleged violation of any general civil 
or criminal statute of such State. 
(7) Limitation 
Whenever the Commission has instituted a civil action for 
violation of regulations prescribed under this section, no State 
may, during the pendency of such action instituted by the 
Commission, subsequently institute a civil action against any 
defendant named in the Commission's complaint for any violation 
as alleged in the Commission's complaint. 
(8) "Attorney general" defined 
As used in this subsection, the term "attorney general" means 
the chief legal officer of a State. 
(June 19, 1934, ch. 652, title II, Sec. 227, as added Dec. 20, 
1992, Pub.L. 102-556, title IV, Sec. 402, 106 Stat. 4194; Oct. 25, 
1994, Pub.L. 103-414, title III, Sec. 303(a) (11), (12), 108 Stat. 
4294.) 
AMENDMENTS 
1994 - Subsec. (b)(2)(C). Pub.L. 103-414, Sec. 303(a)(11), 
substituted "paragraph" for "paragraphs". 
Subsec. (e)(2). Pub.L. 103-414, Sec. 303(a) (12), substituted 
"national database" for "national datebase" after "such 
single". 
1992 - Subsec. (b)(2)(C). Pub.L. 102-556 added subpar. (C). 
EFFECTIVE DATE; DEADLINE FOR REGULATIONS 
Section 3(c) of Pub.L. 102-243, as amended by Pub.L. 102-556, 
title I, Sec. 102, Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 4186, provided that: 
"(1) Regulations. - The Federal Communications Commission shall 
prescribe regulations to implement the amendments made by this 
section (enacting this section and amending section 152 of this 
title) not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this 
Act (Dec. 20, 1991). 
"(2) Effective date. - The requirements of section 227 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (this section) (as added by this 
section), other than the authority to prescribe regulations, shall 
take effect one year after the date of enactment of this Act (Dec. 
20, 1991)." 
CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT OF FINDINGS 
Section 2 of Pub.L. 102-243 provided that: "The Congress finds 
that: 
"(1) The use of the telephone to market goods and services to 
the home and other businesses is now pervasive due to the 
increased use of cost-effective telemarketing techniques. 
"(2) Over 30,000 businesses actively telemarket goods and 
services to business and residential customers. 
"(3) More than 300,000 solicitors call more than 18,000,000 
Americans every day. 
"(4) Total United States sales generated through telemarketing 
amounted to $435,000,000,000 in 1990, a more than four-fold 
increase since 1984. 
"(5) Unrestricted telemarketing, however, can be an intrusive 
invasion of privacy and, when an emergency or medical assistance 
telephone line is seized, a risk to public safety. 
"(6) Many consumers are outraged over the proliferation of 
intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers. 
"(7) Over half the States now have statutes restricting 
various uses of the telephone for marketing, but telemarketers 
can evade their prohibitions through interstate operations; 
therefore, Federal law is needed to control residential 
telemarketing practices. 
"(8) The Constitution does not prohibit restrictions on 
commercial telemarketing solicitations. 
"(9) Individuals' privacy rights, public safety interests, and 
commercial freedoms of speech and trade must be balanced in a way 
that protects the privacy of individuals and permits legitimate 
"(10) Evidence compiled by the Congress indicates that 
residential telephone subscribers consider automated or 
prerecorded telephone calls, regardless of the content or the 
initiator of the message, to be a nuisance and an invasion of 
privacy. 
"(11) Technologies that might allow consumers to avoid 
receiving such calls are not universally available, are costly, 
are unlikely to be enforced, or place an inordinate burden on the 
consumer. 
"(12) Banning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to 
the home, except when the receiving party consents to receiving 
the call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency 
situation affecting the health and safety of the consumer, is the 
only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this 
nuisance and privacy invasion. 
"(13) While the evidence presented to the Congress indicates 
that automated or prerecorded calls are a nuisance and an 
invasion of privacy, regardless of the type of call, the Federal 
Communications Commission should have the flexibility to design 
different rules for those types of automated or prerecorded calls 
that it finds are not considered a nuisance or invasion of 
privacy, or for noncommercial calls, consistent with the free 
speech protections embodied in the First Amendment of the 
Constitution. 
11
 (14) Businesses also have complained to the Congress and the 
Federal Communications Commission that automated or prerecorded 
telephone calls are a nuisance, are an invasion of privacy, and 
interfere with interstate commerce. 
"(15) The Federal Communications Commission should consider 
adopting reasonable restrictions on automated or prerecorded 
calls to businesses as well as to the home, consistent with the 
constitutional protections of free speech." 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in section 152 of this title. 
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TITLE 47--TELECOMMUNICATION 
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Subpart L--Restrictions on Telephone Solicitation 
1.1200 Delivery restrictions. 
i No person may: 
Initiate any telephone call (other than a call made for 
icy purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called 
using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or 
)rded voice, 
To any emergency telephone line, including any 911 line and any 
icy line of a hospital, medical physician or service office, 
care facility, poison control center, or fire protection or law 
jment agency; 
.) To the telephone line of any guest room or patient room of a 
L1, health care facility, elderly home, or similar establishment; 
i) To any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular 
278]] 
ne service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio 
carrier service, or any service for which the called party is 
for the call; 
Initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line 
n artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without 
or express consent of the called party, unless the call is 
ed for emergency purposes or is exempted by Sec. 64.1200(c) of 
ction. 
Use a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to 
unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine. 
Use an automatic telephone dialing system in such a way that two 
telephone lines of a multi-line business are engaged 
neously. 
For the purpose of Sec. 64.1200(a) of this section, the term 
zy purposes means calls made necessary in any situation affecting 
Lth and safety of consumers. 
The term telephone call in Sec. 64.1200(a)(2) of this section 
Dt include a call or message by, or on behalf of, a caller: 
That is not made for a commercial purpose, 
That is made for a commercial purpose but does not include the 
ssion of any unsolicited advertisement, 
To any person with whom the caller has an established business 
iship at the time the call is made, or 
Which is a tax-exempt nonprofit organization. 
All artificial or prerecorded telephone messages delivered by an 
Lc telephone dialing system shall: 
At the beginning of the message, state clearly the identity of 
.ness, individual, or other entity initiating the call, and 
During or after the message, state clearly the telephone number 
:han that of the autodialer or prerecorded message player which 
:he call) or address of such business, other entity, or 
Lai. 
No person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation to 
>ntial telephone subscriber: 
Before the hour of 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m. (local time at the 
(2) Unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for 
taining a list of persons who do not wish to receive telephone 
citations made by or on behalf of that person or entity. The 
edures instituted must meet the following minimum standards: 
(i) Written policy. Persons or entities making telephone 
citations must have a written policy, available upon demand, for 
taining a do-not-call list. 
(ii) Training of personnel engaged in telephone solicitation, 
onnel engaged in any aspect of telephone solicitation must be 
rmed and trained in the existence and use of the do-not-call list, 
(iii) Recording, disclosure of do-not-call requests. If a person or 
ty making a telephone solicitation (or on whose behalf a 
citation is made) receives a request from a residential telephone 
criber not to receive calls from that person or entity, the person 
ntity must record the request and place the subscriber's name and 
phone number on the do-not-call list at the time the request is 
:. If such requests are recorded or maintained by a party other than 
person or entity on whose behalf the solicitation is made, the 
on or entity on whose behalf the solicitation is made will be liable 
any failures to honor the do-not-call request. In order to protect 
consumer's privacy, persons or entities must obtain a consumer's 
>r express consent to share or forward the consumer's request not to 
:alled to a party other than the person or entity on whose behalf a 
.citation is made or an affiliated entity. 
(iv) Identification of telephone solicitor. A person or entity 
.ng a telephone solicitation must provide the called party with the 
> of the individual caller, the name of the person or entity on whose 
ilf the call is being made, and a telephone number or address at 
:h the person or entity may be contacted. If a person or entity makes 
)licitation using an artificial or prerecorded voice message 
ismitted by an autodialer, the person or entity must provide a 
*phone number other 
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i that of the autodialer or prerecorded message player which placed 
call. The telephone number provided may not be a 900 number or any 
ar number for which charges exceed local or long distance 
ismission charges. 
(v) Affiliated persons or entities. In the absence of a specific 
uest by the subscriber to the contrary, a residential subscriber's 
riot-call request shall apply to the particular business entity making 
call (or on whose behalf a call is made), and will not apply to 
iliated entities unless the consumer reasonably would expect them to 
included given the identification of the caller and the product being 
ertised. 
(vi) Maintenance of do-not-call lists. A person or entity making 
ephone solicitations must maintain a record of a caller's request not 
receive future telephone solicitations. A do not call request must be 
ored for 10 years from the time the request is made. 
(f) As used in this section: 
(1) The terms automatic telephone dialing system and autodialer mean 
.ipment which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers 
be called using a random or sequential number generator and to dial 
:h numbers. 
(2) The term telephone facsimile machine means equipment which has 
; capacity to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an 
sctronic signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone 
le, or to transcribe text or images (or both) from an electronic 
jnal received over a regular telephone line onto paper. 
(3) The term telephone solicitation means the initiation of a 
Lephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or 
ital of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is 
ansmitted to any person, but such term does not include a call or 
ssage: 
(i) To any person with that person's prior express invitation or 
rmission; 
(ii) To any person with whom the caller has an established business 
lationship; or 
(Hi) Bv or on behalf of a tax-exempt nonprofit organization. 
ng reiationsnip tormed by a voluntary two-way communication 
m a person or entity and a residential subscriber with or without 
hange of consideration, on the basis of an inquiry, application, 
se or transaction by the residential subscriber regarding products 
vices offered by such person or entity, which relationship has not 
reviously terminated by either party. 
) The term unsolicited advertisement means any material 
ising the commercial availability or quality of any property, 
or services which is transmitted to any person without that 
's prior express invitation or permission. 
48335, Oct. 23, 1992; 57 FR 53293, Nov. 9, 1992, as amended at 60 
69, Aug. 15, 1995] 
